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Comments
The Deductibility of Fixed Donations Made to
Churches as Charitable Contributions
Under the Internal Revenue Code:
Staples v. Commissioner
As members of the Church of Scientology, Maureen and
Michael Staples discovered their inner spiritual dimensions
through a process called "auditing."1 The Staples also took
"training" courses in which they studied Church doctrines, ten-
ets, and practices.2 To participate in these auditing and training
1. See Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir. 1987). The
Church of Scientology was started by American science fiction writer L. Ron
Hubbard, as "'Dianetics, the modern science of mental health."' INFoRMA-
TION PLEASE ALMANAC 450 (40th ed. 1987). The present Church maintains nu-
merous branches around the world. See Church of Scientology v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 386 (1984), cf'd, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987).
According to Scientology doctrine, "the individual is a spiritual being hav-
ing a mind and a body." Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir.
1987). Part of the mind, the reactive mind, is filled with mental images that
often are the source of irrational behavior. Id. Through auditing and training
sessions, see infra note 2, the Church helps an individual erase the reactive
mind and gain spiritual competence. Graham, 822 F.2d at 846. Cleared of
mental and physical handicaps, Church members become superior beings
"equipped with a higher intelligence and a greater command over the pattern
of [their lives]." INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC, supra, at 450; see also
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1215 (1st Cir. 1987), cert granted,
108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988). Individuals receive benefits only in degrees through the
auditing process. Graham, 822 F.2d at 846. A trained S ientologist, or "audi-
tor," administers the auditing with the help of an electronic device called an
'"-meter." Graham v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 575, qff'd, 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.
1987). "This device helps the auditor identify the [individual's] areas of spiri-
tual difficulty by measuring skin responses during a question and answer ses-
sion." Id. Although auditing involves private, person-to-person exchanges, the
sessions are ritualistic in nature. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325. Hence,
although auditing is structured like a counseling session, the exchange is not
tailored to the particular individual. See Graham, 822 F.2d at 846 (describing
standard steps in auditing process).
2. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325. The Church offers group training and
education through basic introductory courses in the doctrines of Scientology,
auditor training courses, courses in Church management methods, and general
educational courses. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1215 n.2. Scientologists believe
that spiritual gains result from studying Church doctrines. Id.
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sessions, the Staples paid the "fixed donations" 3 mandated by
the Church. The Staples deducted these payments from their
federal income taxes as charitable contributions.4
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied the deduc-
tions on the ground that the Staples' fixed donations were not
deductible contributions or gifts within the meaning of the In-
ternal Revenue Code.5 In Staples v. Commissioner,6 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the IRS position.7 The court
allowed the Staples' deductions, even though the couple re-
ceived benefits in the form of auditing and training services, be-
cause those benefits were strictly religious in nature.8
The three other courts of appeal that have considered the
deductibility of Scientologists' fixed donations each held that
the donations were not contributions or gifts.9 The courts ap-
plied traditional principles and denied the deductions because
3. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325. The Church offers auditing sessions in
fixed blocks of time called "intensives." Graham, 83 T.C. at 577. The Church
almost always charges for training and auditing sessions, with exceptions only
for fully contracted staff members. Id. at 577 & n.6. The Church offers dis-
counts for package purchases and advance payments. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at
1215 n.3. In addition, individuals can obtain refunds for undelivered services.
Id. Fixed donations constitute the majority of the Church's receipts, and the
Church uses the donations to pay the costs of its operations and activities.
Graham, 822 F.2d at 847.
The Church's "doctrine of exchange" requires members to make a contri-
bution in exchange for anything of value that they receive. See Hernandez,
819 F.2d at 1222. Because those who do not reciprocate suffer spiritual decline,
the doctrine of exchange necessitates the system of mandatory fixed dona-
tions. See id.
4. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325; see also 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1982 & Supp. M
1985), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 142(d),
231(f), 301(b)(2), 1831, 100 Stat. 2085, 2120, 2180, 2217, 2851 (governing deduct-
ibility of charitable.contributions); infra note 73 and accompanying text. Be-
cause individuals may pay large yearly sums in fixed donations, deductions
may be substantial. For example, in Hernandez the petitioning Scientologist
paid $7338 to the Church during the year in question. 819 F.2d at 1215. The
Staples opinion does not note how much the Staples paid to the Church. See
821 F.2d at 1325.
5. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325.
6. 821 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987).
7. See id. at 1328.
8. Id. at 1327; infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
9. The First Circuit was the first appellate court to address the issue.
That court denied deductions to Scientologists for their fixed donations. See
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1227 (1st Cir. 1987), cert granted,
108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988). One month after that decision, the Eighth Circuit up-
held the deductibility of fixed donations in Staples. See 821 F.2d at 1328. Since
Staples, two circuits have followed the First Circuit and denied Scientologists'
deductions. See Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 506 (4th Cir. 1987); Graham v.
Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1987).
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the Scientologists received direct benefits in return for their do-
nations.10 The Staples court's decision excepted direct benefits
that were "strictly religious" from this established test.1 '
Broadly applied, the Staples ruling could affect signifi-
cantly not only the Church of Scientology but also other reli-
gious and nonreligious charitable organizations. 12 The finding
that Scientologists' fixed donations are deductible conflicts with
settled cases holding nondeductible payments made for other
religious benefits, like Bas Mitzvahs and confirmation ceremo-
nies.' 3 In addition, the Staples court's view of the tax code
might encourage religious organizations to charge for religious
services. 14 The court's ruling also disadvantages secular chari-
table organizations,' 5 notwithstanding the tax code requirement
of similar treatment for all charitable organizations. 16 Further-
more, under the analysis employed in Staples, courts in future
cases will have to distinguish between strictly religious and par-
tially religious benefits as well as between religious and non-
religious benefits.' 7 Not only will this task be difficult, but it
also may be unconstitutional.' 8
This Comment analyzes the Eighth Circuit's conclusions
regarding the deductibility of fixed donations made by mem-
bers of the Church of Scientology. Part I sets forth the legal
background behind the charitable contribution deduction. Part
II presents the Staples court's reasoning, critiques that reason-
ing, and analyzes Scientologists' donations under traditional
"contribution or gift" principles. This Comment concludes that
the court's religious benefit test confounds settled presump-
tions in the law of charitable contributions. To protect the poli-
cies underlying the charitable contribution deduction, courts
should find Scientologists' fixed donations nondeductible under
10. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 505; Graham, 822 F.2d at 850; Hernandez, 819
F.2d at 1218; infra notes 31-61 and accompanying text.
11. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326-28.
12. With the current proliferation of television evangelism and religious
cults, the test for deductibility of donations made to religious organizations
takes on added importance. See FCC Watered Down PTL Report, Investigator
Says, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Jan. 22, 1988, at 3A, col. 1 (discussing how Jim
and Tammy Bakker appropriated, for their own use, funds solicited for PTL
ministry's religious purposes).
13. See Feistman v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 590, 592 (1972).
14. See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
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established tax principles denying deductions for donations that
produce direct benefits for the taxpayer.
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT: CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
The tax code provides that a donation to a charitable or-
ganization is deductible from a donor's federal income taxes if
two prerequisites exist: the recipient organization must qualify
for tax-exempt status,19 and any donation must constitute a
"contribution or gift."20 Though interrelated, these two prereq-
uisites are independent and must be assessed separately.
A. TAx-ExEMPT STATUS UNDER SECTION 501(c)(3)
An organization qualifies for tax-exempt status if it is "or-
ganized and operated" exclusively for one or more of the chari-
table purposes enumerated in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.21 The organizational and operational tests are
distinct, and an organization must meet both prongs to be tax-
exempt.22
19. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982) (providing qualifications for tax-ex-
empt status). See generally Thompson, The Unadministrability of the Federal
Charitable Tax Exemption: Causes, Effects, and Remedies, 5 VA. TAX REV. 1
(1985) (discussing tax-exempt status and its problems); Comment, The Revoca-
tion of Tax Exemptions and Tax Deductions for Donations to 501(c)(3) Orga-
nizations on Statutory and Constitutional Grounds, 30 UCLA L. REv. 156
(1982) (analyzing history of charitable tax exemptions and deductions). Be-
cause the parties stipulated to the Church of Scientology's tax-exempt status
in Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir. 1987); infra note 87,
that status was not in question.
20. Internal Revenue Code § 170 allows the deduction from taxable in-
come of any "contribution or gift to or for the use of... [a] corporation, trust,
or community chest, fund, or foundation . . . organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or
to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals." 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2) (1982).
21. See id. § 501(c)(3); supra note 19.
22. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1976); see also Hall
v. Commissioner, 729 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing and analyzing or-
ganizational and operational tests). To satisfy the organizational test, a chari-
table body must meet four requirements. The entity's articles of organization
must limit the scope of the organization's activities to exempt purposes. Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i)(a) (as amended in 1976); see supra note 19. The ar-
ticles may "not expressly empower the organization to engage, otherwise than
as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which themselves are not
in furtherance of... exempt purposes." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(b)
(as amended in 1976). The exempt organization's articles may not empower
the entity to devote substantial amounts of time to influencing legislation or
1058 [Vol. 72:1055
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B. CONTRuIBU'ION OR GIFT UNDER SECTION 170
A taxpayer may deduct a donation to a qualified tax-ex-
empt organization only if the donation is a "contribution or
gift" within the meaning of section 170 of the tax code. 23 Be-
cause the code does not define this phrase,24 courts interpret-
ing it have considered the policies that underlie the charitable
contribution deduction.25
1. Policies Behind Section 170
Congress created the tax deduction for charitable contribu-
tions under the premise that such donations benefit the general
public. 2 6 Although an individual donor might receive an inner
elections. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3). The organization's articles must expressly
dedicate its assets to an exempt purpose. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4).
Meeting the organizational test is only the first step in attaining tax-ex-
empt status. The organization also must satisfy the four elements of the oper-
ational test. The organization must engage "primarily in activities which
accomplish one or more ... exempt purposes." Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1); see
supra note 19. The organization's net earnings may not "inure... to the bene-
fit of private shareholders or individuals." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(2) (as
amended in 1976). The organization must not expend a substantial part of its
resources attempting to influence legislation or political campaigns. Id.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3). Finally, organizations seeking exemption from taxes
must serve a valid public purpose and confer a public benefit. See Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585-92 (1983).
23. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1982); supra note 20.
24. See Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 502 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that
the terms contribution and gift are synonymous).
25. See id. at 504-05. In deciding whether a donation is a "contribution or
gift," courts often have loosely applied labels to the types of return benefits a
donor receives. Opinions thus present pairs of antonyms that do not necessar-
ily relate to other pairs, but which are all relevant. The cases speak of "di-
rect" versus "indirect" benefits, see id. (noting that Scientologists' auditing and
training sessions were direct, rather than indirect, benefits thus rendering
fixed donations nondeductible); "tangible" versus "intangible" benefits, see
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1217 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that
receipt of intangible items such as adoption services, symphony performances,
and museum admissions in return for donations destroyed deductibility), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988); "substantial" or "commensurate" versus "nomi-
nal" benefits, see United States v. American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. 2426,
2434 (1986) (holding that while receipt of direct and commensurate return
benefit made whole donation nondeductible, receipt of direct but nominal ben-
efit only made donation partly nondeductible); and "religious" versus "secu-
lar" benefits, see Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1987)
(finding religious nature of return benefit was of no consequence in determin-
ing whether donation was deductible). Despite the differences in terminology,
the facts of the cases permit generalizations. See infra notes 26-61 and accom-
panying text.
26. See Rev. Rul. 71-580, 1971-2 C.B. 235, 236 (noting that law of charity
recognizes that religious observances benefit general public). Congress found
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satisfaction from giving or an incidental benefit shared with
other members of the community, Congress determined that
such indirect benefits alone should not destroy a deduction.27 A
donation serves the broader public only when it supports a
charitable organization's general purposes.28 If an organization
must use a donation to provide a direct individualized benefit,
the organization cannot use the funds to pursue ends that bene-
fit all of society.29 Thus, donations that directly benefit individ-
ual donors, rather than a broader community, are not tax
deductible.3 0
2. Directness of the Benefit Test
Courts describe differently their approaches to assessing
whether a donation constitutes a contribution or gift. For ex-
ample, some courts ask whether a transaction evidences a quid
pro quo,3 ' while others purport to inquire whether the taxpayer
that certain charitable activities benefit society and thus are desirable. -See
Wiedenbeck, Chaitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. REV.
85, 95-97 (1985) (discussing policy justifications for charitable contribution de-
duction). Because tax-exempt organizations operate "exclusively" for religious
or charitable purposes by definition, see 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982); supra note
22, such organizations perform works that benefit society. The standards for
attaining tax-exempt status are rigid, see id., and to maintain that rank, orga-
nizations must further specified ends that benefit the public. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (describing qualifications for tax-exempt status).
27. For example, an individual who gives money to a museum, see Rev.
Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, or an orchestra, see Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B.
104, 109-10, receives a personal benefit in the continued viability of the organi-
zation. This benefit, however, reaches all the members of the community and
is not limited to donating individuals.
28. The exclusive purposes requirement of § 501(c)(3) implies that a chari-
table recipient must have control over the donation to use toward the organi-
zation's charitable activities. Therefore, direct benefits to a donor given in
return for a donation are antithetical to the exclusive purposes clause. See
Wiedenbeek, supra note 26, at 102 (discussing examples of direct benefits that
render contributions nondeductible under exclusive purposes clause).
29. The limitation of the § 170 deduction to a "contribution or gift" ad-
dressed two concerns. See Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (W.D.
Mich. 1978). Congress feared that charitable organizations offering products
and services in competition with those offered by businesses would gain an un-
fair competitive advantage. See id. In addition, Congress recognized that
when a contributor received a quid pro quo, the amount of the donation avail-
able for support of the charitable organization would be reduced by the cost of
providing the benefit. See id.; see also Colliton, The Meaning of "Contribution
or Gift"for Charitable Contribution Deduction Purposes, 41 OHmo ST. L.J. 973,
979-1003 (1980) (emphasizing that receipt of direct benefit makes donation
nondeductible).
30. See Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 504-05 (4th Cir. 1987).
31. See id. at 502-03; Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir.
1060
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harbors a donative intent.32 Regardless of characterization, the
various approaches are functionally equivalent. Essentially,
courts assess whether a taxpayer receives any direct benefit, as
opposed to merely indirect benefits, in return for a donation.33
If the donor receives a direct benefit, the donation is not fully
deductible.34
Direct and indirect benefits are distinguished based on who
receives the benefit of the donation. Specific examples illus-
trate the differences between the two categories. The prototyp-
ical charitable contribution deduction involves a donation in
return for which a taxpayer receives only indirect benefits. For
example, a taxpayer may make a donation to a bar associa-
tion,35 an adoption agency,36 a museum,3 7 or any other tax-ex-
empt organization. If she receives no individualized benefit in
return, her payment is fully deductible.38 Such a taxpayer
might derive an inner satisfaction from giving or might benefit,
along with the rest of the community, from the recipient organ-
ization's continued vitality. The full value of the donation is de-
ductible, however, because society receives the primary benefits
from the donation.39
The unifying factor among all direct benefits is their per-
1987); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1216 (1st Cir. 1987), cert
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988).
32. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 502-03; Graham, 822 F.2d at 848-49.
33. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 504-05.
34. Compare Morton v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 621, 625 (1979)
(allowing deduction for transfer of property to city for use in connection with
city's water system because taxpayers received no direct benefit in return for
transfer) with Ottawa Silica Co. v. Commissioner, 699 F.2d 1124, 1135 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (denying deduction for conveyance of land to school
district because plaintiff knew that construction of school and attendant roads
would subtantially benefit his surrounding lands by increasing property
value). Although these cases involve donations to government bodies rather
than charitable organizations, the principles for finding a charitable contribu-
tion are the same.
35. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. 2426, 2434
(1986).
36. See Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 249, 254-55 (1970).
37. See Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, 104-05.
38. Such a donation is fully deductible because the charitable organization
can use the full amount of the donation toward its broad purposes. Consider,
for example, a taxpayer who makes a $100 donation to a tax-exempt museum.
If that taxpayer receives in return only a positive feeling from giving and a
benefit in the continued vitality of the museum that she shares with the whole
community, the donation is a deductible contribution or gift. See supra note 27
and accompanying text. In that case, the taxpayer receives only indirect bene-
fits, and the museum can use the funds for its charitable purposes.
39. See id.
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sonal orientation. These benefits enhance the donor in some
immediate way. For example, direct benefits frequently pro-
vide tangible financial or economic gains. In the simplest case,
such benefits can take the form of a tangible items such as ra-
dios, greeting cards, and meals. 40 Direct benefits are not lim-
ited to tangible items, however. Charitable organizations can
provide intangible services to a donating taxpayer just as di-
rectly as more tangible goods. Thus, direct benefits can appear
in intangible. forms such as insurance benefits,41 adoption serv-
ices,42 medical benefits,43 museum membership privileges," and
concert admissions.45
A taxpayer who receives a direct benefit in return for a do-
nation cannot take a full deduction. The personal nature of the
direct benefit ensures that society will not be the primary bene-
ficiary of the donation.46 Even though the taxpayer receives a
direct benefit, however, part of the donation may be deductible.
If the value of the direct return benefit is commensurate with
the value of the donation, the whole donation is nondeduct-
ible.47 If, on the other hand, the value of the donation exceeds
40. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 108-09, 111 (discussing availabil-
ity of deductions for various hypothetical examples of payments to charitable
organizations as part of fund-raising efforts).
41. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. 2426, 2434
(1986) (denying deduction for funds paid to bar association for which taxpayer
received insurance of commensurate value).
42. See Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 249, 254-55 (1970) (denying de-
duction for funds paid to adoption agency which provided adoption services to
taxpayer).
43. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4621, 4830-31 (noting that limitations on business
deductions for charitable contributions above allowable percentage limits
would not apply to employer's contribution to hospital in return for binding
obligation to provide medical treatment for employees).
44. See Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, 104-05 (discussing availability of
charitable deductions for donations to museum).
45. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 107-11 (discussing availability of
charitable deductions for various hypothetical examples of donations to fund-
raising events).
46. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
47. The whole donation is nondeductible because the charitable organiza-
tion must use the funds to provide the individualized benefit, and thus it can
retain none of the donation to pursue its broader purposes. Consider again a
taxpayer who makes a $100 donation to a tax-exempt museum. See supra note
38. If the taxpayer receives, in return for the donation, a year-long admission
pass worth $100, the direct benefit received prevents the deductability of the
donation. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Because the value of the
donation equals the value of the benefit, the taxpayer's benefit is not only di-
rect but also commensurate. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see
also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
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the value of the direct return benefit, the taxpayer may deduct
the difference. 48 To take this partial deduction, the taxpayer
receiving such a "nominal" 49 direct benefit must prove both
that she intended 50 to make a gift and that her donation
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4621, 4831 (noting that Congress meant "contribution
or gift" to include "those contributions which are made with no expectation of
a financial return commensurate with the amount of the gift").
This analysis suggests a direct tradeoff between societal and individual
benefits, but the correlation is not that clear. Assume a donor receives noth-
ing in return for a payment beyond the indirect benefits received as a member
of the group at the focus of the organization's generosity. In this case the or-ganization, at least theoretically, can use the donation to maximize the bene-
fits to society. The inverse does not necessarily follow, however. Even when a
donor receives a commensurate benefit in return for a donation, the recipient
organization still might use the transaction to benefit society. Consider a
church that sells meals to raise funds. The purchaser of a meal cannot deduct
the cost (assuming the price reflects the value of the dinner). Yet, the church
may benefit if the food and preparation services are donated. The church thus
could use the funds raised in meal sales toward its broader goals. This kind of
attenuated benefit analysis would be difficult for courts to follow in varied cir-
cumstances.
Courts are therefore more competent to look to the primary beneficiary of
the specific transaction in question because an assessment of the flow of bene-
fits in this narrow context is more quantifiable. For examples see supra note
38 and infra note 51. Although this characterization is simplistic, it is the gen-
eral mode of differentiation that courts use to assess whether a taxpayer re-
ceives a direct benefit in return for a donation.
48. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. 2426, 2433-
34(1986).
49. See id. at 2433. The label nominal describes a benefit that is less in
value than the taxpayer's donation. Essentially, the taxpayer receives a mixed
benefit. On the one hand, the donor receives a direct benefit, but the value of
that benefit does not equal the value of the donation. On the other hand, the
individual also receives an indirect personal benefit from the part of the dona-
tion that the charitable organization uses for its broader public works. See
supra note 47. Just as with commensurate return benefits, a nominal benefit
can appear in a tangible or intangible form. See supra notes 40-45 and accom-
panying text.
50. In attempting to define "contribution or gift," courts have questioned
the relevancy of the donor's subjective intent or motive. See Miller v. IRS, 829
F.2d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1987); Hobbet, Charitable Contributions-How Charita-
ble Must They Be?, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 4-11 (1980) (discussing cases con-
sidering relevancy of subjective intent to charitable contribution deductions).
The Supreme Court has defined the word gift under § 102 of the tax code in
terms of the taxpayer's "'detached and disinterested generosity.'" Commis-
sioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue,
351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)); 26 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Courts have pondered
"whether this definition solely in terms of donative intent should also apply to
§ 170, and, if not, whether and how the courts should respect the common law
requirement that an inter vivos 'gift' also be made without consideration."
Miller, 829 F.2d at 502; see also Colliton, supra note 29, at 974-79 (discussing
history and purpose of § 170).
Some courts have applied the Duberstein test to the § 170 setting and in-
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quired into the taxpayer's donative intent. See, e.g., DeJong v. Commissioner,
309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1962) (assessing intent of taxpayers making tuition
payments to parochial schools). Others, however, have rejected the "detached
and disinterested generosity" inquiry and looked objectively at whether the
taxpayer received a direct return benefit. See, e.g., Oppewal v. Commissioner,
468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1972) ("The more fundamental objective test is-
however the payment was designated, and whatever motives the taxpayer had
in making it, was it, to any substantial extent, offset by the cost of services
rendered to taxpayers in the nature of tuition?"); Singer Co. v. United States,
449 F.2d 413, 423 (Ct. Cl. 1971) ("It is our opinion that if the benefits received
... are substantial, and meaning by that, benefits greater than those that inure
to the general public from transfers for charitable purposes (which benefits
are merely incidental to the transfer), then in such case we feel the transferor
has received . . . a quid pro quo sufficient to remove the transfer from the
realm of deductibility under section 170.") (emphasis in original).
Under § 170, the Supreme Court has stated that courts must inquire into
the taxpayers' intentions when the individuals receive nominal benefits in re-
turn for donations. See American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. at 2434; supra
text accompanying notes 49-51. To be deductible, donations must advance the
policies of the charitable contribution deduction. See supra notes 26-30 and ac-
companying text. Thus, the Court found that for donors to take a deduction
when they receive a mixed benefit, part direct and part indirect, they must in-
tend to make a charitable contribution and thus advance the organization's
public policies. American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. at 2434.
In nominal benefit cases, the Court essentially has created a presumption
against deductibility. Because a taxpayer must show donative intent to take a
deduction, the taxpayer's receipt of a direct but minimal benefit-either a
good or a service-could make the entire payment nondeductible. The Court,
however, has not required a similar showing of donative intent when a tax-
payer receives either only indirect benefits as a member of society or a fully
commensurate benefit.
In these latter two cases, intent is not a determinative factor. Cf. Miller,
829 F.2d at 503 (professing to focus on taxpayers' intent but assessing intent
from structure of transaction, that is, whether exchange evinced quid pro quo);
Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1987) (same). When an
individual receives only indirect benefits in return for a donation and society
receives the primary benefits, the policies of the charitable contribution deduc-
tion are satisfied and the issue of intent becomes nugatory. If a taxpayer's do-
nation primarily benefits the public, courts should disregard the issue of
intent.
A similar argument applies when a taxpayer receives a direct and com-
mensurate benefit. In such a case, intent must be irrelevant. If individuals
could claim deductions by alleging donative intentions even when those people
receive commensurate return benefits, any transaction involving a charitable
organization would be deductible. Such a construction would run afoul of
§ 170. In that section Congress limited deductions to contributions or gifts
partly to avoid giving charitable organizations a competitive edge over nonex-
empt entities in providing goods and services in the marketplace. See Haak v.
United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (W.D. Mich. 1978). Intent cannot be a
factor in a court's determination of deductibility when the individual receives
a commensurate return benefit because, regardless of the donor's intent, the
policies of the charitable contribution deduction are not forwarded, i.e., the
public does not receive the primary benefits from the donation. See supra
notes 26, 28 and accompanying text.
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exceeded the value of the benefit received.51
3. Donations to Religious Organizations
Section 170 of the tax code does not distinguish between
religious and nonreligious charitable organizations. 52 Thus,
courts traditionally have determined whether a donation to a
religious organization is a contribution or gift by using direct-
ness of the benefit principles. 53 Courts have allowed full deduc-
tions for donations made to churches in forms such as
collection plate offeringsM and basket contributions.55 People
*who make these types of donations receive only indirect bene-
fits,5 while the primary benefits fall on the congregation as a
whole.57 When a person receives a direct benefit in return for a
donation to a religious organization, the donation is not fully
deductible.58 The donor can deduct only the portion of the do-
51. American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. at 2434. Consider again the tax-
payer who donates $100 to a tax-exempt museum. See supra notes 38, 47. If
that taxpayer receives a one-month admission pass worth $10 in return for her
donation, she has received a nominal benefit. The benefit is direct in that it
falls exclusively on the individual donor. The museum cannot use the $10 to-
ward its broader purposes. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The
benefit, however, is nominal in the sense that it is worth less than the full do-
nation. The directness of the nominal benefit, like the directness of a com-
mensurate benefit, makes the donation nondeductible. See supra notes 28-30
and accompanying text. Because the nominal benefit does not equal the value
of the donation, however, the taxpayer can deduct the portion of the donation
over the value of the nominal benefit-i.e., $90-if she proves she intended to
make a charitable contribution.
52. See supra notes 19-20.
53. Cf Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 C.B. 49 (allowing deductions for pew rents,
periodic church dues, and building fund assessments because benefits to indi-
viduals were too remote).
54. See Nelsen v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 172, 178-79 (1948), qff'd
per curiam, 177 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1949).
55. See A.R.M. 2, 1 C.B. 150 (1919).
56. See Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1987). These indirect ben-
efits are shared by all members of the congregation. Whether the donation
helps to buy an organ, pay a clergy member, or heat a church building, the
benefit is distributed across the church community.
57. This kind of indirect benefit is similar to the benefit a donor receives
when giving to a secular charitable organization. When individuals give to
charitable operations, they receive benefits as members of the organization's
community. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Although a religious
congregation may be significantly smaller than the group within reach of a
secular charitable organization, courts view the two similarly. Cf. cases cited
supra notes 54-55.
58. Compare Rev. Rul. 76-232, 1976-1 C.B. 62 (allowing deduction for dona-
tion for weekend marriage seminar conducted by charitable organization only
to extent that payment actually exceeded value of service) with Nelsen, 7
T.C.M. (CCH) at 178-79 (allowing deduction for collection plate offerings) and
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nation that exceeds the value of the direct return benefit.5 9
This rule holds true whether the direct benefit is a tangible
good, such as a hymnal or prayer book, or an intangible reli-
gious service, such as a Bas Mitzvah 60 or a confirmation.6'
Although the tax code does not distinguish between reli-
gious and nonreligious charitable organizations, the United
States Constitution requires added considerations for courts in-
quiring into the affairs of religious organizations. When courts
apply the "contribution or gift" limitation to donations to reli-
gious organizations, they are bound by the first amendment. 62
Under the free exercise clause, the government may neither
pressure followers of a religion to commit acts forbidden by
their religion nor prevent them from engaging in conduct
which their faith mandates.63  Under the establishment
clause, 64 the government may neither advance certain religions
Rev. Rul. 78-366, 1978-2 C.B. 241 (allowing deduction for bequest for masses
because masses would be performed regardless of individual donation) and
A.R.M. 2, 1 C.B. 150 (1919) (allowing deduction for basket contributions). In
the latter three cases, the benefit the taxpayers received was indirect.
59. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
60. For a description of a Bas Mitzvah ceremony, see inrfra text accompa-
nying note 122.
61. See Feistman v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 590, 592 (1972) (deny-
ing deductions for payments made in return for performances of Bas Mitzvah
and confirmation even though both are religious services); see also Oppewal v.
Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding tuition payments to
parochial schools nondeductible because taxpayers received service in return
for their donations); Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778, 780-81 (2d Cir.
1972) (same); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1962)
(same).
62. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment does not require the government
to provide tax deductions for gifts to religious organizations. See Regan v. Tax-
ation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983). Nor does the first amend-
ment prohibit the government, once it has created such a deduction, from
limiting the amount any taxpayer can deduct. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)
(1982).
63. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 1049
(1987) (finding that denial of unemployment compensation to worker dis-
charged for refusing to work on Sabbath violates free exercise clause); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 410 (1963) (same); Graham v. Commissioner,
822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987). This interference must be substantial
rather than a mere inconvenience. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,
717-18 (1981).
64. In assessing whether a governmental action works to establish reli-
gion, courts inquire: (1) whether the challenged law or conduct has a secular
purpose; (2) whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit
religion; and (3) whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government
with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). A governmen-
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to the detriment of others65 nor inhibit certain religions to the
benefit of others. 66 Thus, courts face the delicate task of pro-
tecting free exercise rights without favoring one religion over
another.67
4. Decisions on Fixed Donations Paid to the Church
of Scientology
The First,68 Fourth,69 and Ninth70 Circuits have considered
tal action must survive each of the three prongs to be constitutional. The
Court, however, has hinted that an infringement of the entanglement pro-
scription alone may not be sufficient to create a constitutional violation. See
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984) (finding city-sponsored nativity
scene does not violate establishment clause). The Lynch Court also noted it
was unwilling to confine itself to any single establisment clause test. Id.
65. The Lemon test prevents the government from favoring the religious
over the nonreligious or certain religions over others. See supra note 64; cf.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794
(1973) (finding that New York law which provided tax benefits to parents of
children attending nonpublic schools had primary effect of advancing religion
because, among other reasons, benefits of law flowed primarily to parents of
children attending sectarian nonpublic schools).
66. Under the excessive entanglement prong, the government may not in-
terfere with a religion to the point of causing harm. See supra note 64. If the
government delves too deeply into a religious organization's practices, harm is
presumed and the resulting entanglement violates the establishment clause.
Compare Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (holding that statutory fi-
nancial reporting obligations imposed on religious organizations that receive
more than 50% of their contributions from nonmembers created unconstitu-
tional political entanglement) with Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76
(1970) (finding that government's assessment of value of charitable organiza-
tions' real property, to implement property tax exemption, created only mini-
mal entanglement).
In addition to these establishment clause protections, both the free exer-
cise and establishment clauses prohibit courts from inquiring into religious be-
liefs and the validity of religious doctrines. Courts may, however, assess the
integrity of individuals who profess religious beliefs. See United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
67. Even if a court seeks to protect free exercise rights, it may not go so
far as to infringe upon the establishment clause. Cf. Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (concluding that state statute granting
employees absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath violated estab-
lishment clause). In addition, violations of the free exercise and establishment
clauses are warranted if the government has interests compelling enough to
outweigh the individuals' first amendment rights. See Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d
500, 506 (4th Cir. 1987); Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 852-53 (9th Cir.
1987); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1225 (1st Cir. 1987), cert
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988); cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)
(holding that government's compelling interest in mandatory participation in
Social Security system sufficiently outweighed burden that compliance im-
posed on taxpayer's religious beliefs).
68. Hernandez, 819 F.2d 1212.
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whether a Scientologist's fixed donation for auditing or training
sessions constitutes a "contribution or gift" under section 170.71
In these cases the IRS maintained that a fixed donation was not
a "contribution or gift. ' ' 72 The Scientologists argued that fixed
69. Miller, 829 F.2d 500.
70. Graham, 822 F.2d 844.
71. The IRS initially concluded that payments for auditing and training,
like tuition payments to parochial schools, were not deductible contributions
or gifts unless taxpayers could establish that their payments exceeded the
value of the benefits and privileges received in return. See Rev. Rul. 78-189,
1978-1 C.B. 68. Before this IRS determination, thousands of Scientologists had
claimed deductions for their fixed donations. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 501.
These Scientologists petitioned the tax court, challenging the Commissioner's
ruling. The taxpayers stipulated that they would be bound by the findings of
fact and law in a tax court test case involving only a few Scientologists. All of
the Scientologists, however, reserved the right to appeal. See id,
The tax court upheld the Commissioner and found that the payments
were not voluntary transfers without consideration, but were made with the
expectation of receiving a commensurate return benefit. Graham v. Commis-
sioner, 83 T.C. 575, 581 (1984), aff'd, 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987). After the
adverse tax court decision, Scientologists raised appeals in all of the circuits
except the Federal Circuit. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1216 n.5. The cases before
the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all arose through this process.
72. The IRS originally opposed Scientologists' deductions on a separate
ground, arguing that the Church of Scientology did not qualify for tax-exempt
status. In 1984, the tax court affirmed an IRS decision to revoke the Church
of Scientology of California's tax-exempt status for the years 1970 to 1972. See
Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381 (1984), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1310
(9th Cir. 1987); see also Friedland, Constitutional Issues in Revoking Religious
Tax Exemptions: Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 37 U.
FLA. L. REV. 565 (1985).
While awaiting a decision in the California church's appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, the IRS challenged Scientologists' deductions on a second ground,
claiming that a fixed donation did not constitute a "contribution or gift." See
supra note 71. That particular challenge produced the line of cases in the
First, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. In all of those cases, the IRS stipu-
lated that the Church was tax-exempt. See infra note 87.
On July 28, 1987, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Commissioner's three-
year revocation of the California church's tax-exempt status. Church of
Scientology v. Commisioner, 823 F.2d 1310, 1322 (9th Cir. 1987).
Until other circuits reach a similar conclusion, the decisions in Miller,
Graham, Staples, and Hernandez remain important for several reasons. An-
other circuit could come to a conclusion at odds with the Ninth Circuit's tax-
exempt status ruling. Furthermore, the rationales of the four circuit courts
addressing the deductibility of fixed donations apply far beyond the narrow
factual contours presented in the cases. See infra notes 119-55 and accompany-
ing text. Perhaps most importantly, the Ninth Circuit's decision pertained
only to the Church's California branch and, even in that context, only for
three specific tax years. Various Church branches have maintained tax-ex-
empt status in other locations and periods. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PuB. No. 78, CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANIZA-
TIONS 246 (1986) (listing as organizations qualified to receive deductible contri-
butions Church branches in 10 states); Announcement 76-119, 1976-37 I.R.B. 27
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donations were deductible because the only benefits received
were strictly religious in nature.73 The taxpayers also raised
first amendment concerns.74
In analyzing the Scientologists' donations, each of the
courts asked whether the payments were part of a quid pro
quo.75 The courts did not limit their inquiry to whether the
taxpayers received economic benefits.76 Instead, each court em-
phasized that the Scientologists making the fixed donations in-
tended to receive a religious service in the form of auditing or
training in return for their payments. 77 Because the taxpayers
expected a commensurate return benefit, all three courts con-
(rescinding suspension of advance assurance of deductibility for donations to
Church of Scientology of New York and noting that donations made to Church
during suspension were deductible).
73. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 503; Graham, 822 F.2d at 848; Hernandez, 819
F.2d at 1216-17.
74. The taxpayers claimed that the Commissioner's construction of § 170
abridged their free exercise rights under the first amendment. See Hernandez,
819 F.2d at 1215. The Scientologists also contended that the Commissioner's
position resulted in an establishment of religion, also prohibited by the first
amendment. See id. Further, the Scientologists raised a claim of selective
prosecution under the first amendment and the equal protection component of
the fifth amendment. See id.
75. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 505; Graham, 822 F.2d at 849; Hernandez, 819
F.2d at 1217.
76. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 505; Graham, 822 F.2d at 849; Hernandez, 819
F.2d at 1217; infra note 92 and accompanying text. The courts agreed that the
controlling question was not whether the payments were gifts for religious
purposes but whether they were gifts at all. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 505; Gra-
ham, 822 F.2d at 848; Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1217. The three appellate courts
thus characterized the issue as "whether a taxpayer who paid the price set by
his church in exchange for specified services provided by the church is entitled
to deduct the payment from his taxable income as a charitable contributon."
Id. at 1215.
77. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 503; Graham, 822 F.2d at 850; Hernandez, 819
F.2d at 1217. Thus the courts adopted the tax court's conclusion that fixed do-
nations were not contributions or gifts because they "were not voluntary
transfers without consideration, but were made with the expectation of receiv-
ing a commensurate benefit in return." Graham v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 575,
581 (1984), aff'd, 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987).
The courts paired a religious service, viewed as the quid, with the fixed
contributions, viewed as the quo, and analogized these scientologist cases to
those cases concerning tuition paid to parochial schools. See supra note 61. In
this framework the Ninth Circuit found that
[s]olicitation for the services and agreements to render them based on
price; conformity in price lists, and graduated prices based on the
level of instruction; the contractual right to receive the service, and
the right of refund if the service was not performed; account cards;
and discounts for advance payments, all underscore that the payment
matched, with some precision, the benefits to be received.
Graham, 822 F.2d at 849.
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cluded that fixed donations were not contributions or gifts 7 8
Although the courts reached similar conclusions, they em-
ployed somewhat different analyses.7 9 The First Circuit fo-
cused on the fixed and mandatory nature of the fixed donations
in finding a quid pro quo.80 That court went so far as to note
that the individualized nature of the benefit was irrelevant to
the question of deductibility.8' Although the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits claimed to focus on the Scientologists' intentions, both
courts in fact looked to the structure of the transaction in find-
ing a quid pro quo.82 Focusing on the external features of the
transaction, the Ninth Circuit stated that the fixed and
mandatory nature of the payment served as an expedient for an
inquiry into motives.8 3 The Fourth Circuit likewise looked to
the structure of the transaction to assess the taxpayers'
intentions.84
78. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 503; Graham, 822 F.2d at 850; Hernandez, 819
F.2d at 1218. As the Ninth Circuit noted:
If a transaction is structured in the form of a quid pro quo, where it is
understood that the taxpayer's money will not pass to the charitable
organization unless the taxpayer receives a specific benefit in return,
and where the taxpayer cannot receive the benefit unless he pays the
required price, then the transaction does not qualify for the deduction
under section 170.
Graham, 822 F.2d at 849.
The Scientologists made no alternative claim that they received only a
nominal benefit, see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text, or a benefit less
in value than their fixed donations. See Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1216. The
Church members argued only that they could deduct the full value of their
fixed donations because they received a strictly religious benefit in return for
their payments. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
79. The tax court denied the Scientologists' deductions because they ex-
pected to receive a commensurate return benefit. See Graham v. Commis-
sioner, 83 T.C. 575, 581 (1984), aff'd, 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987); supra note 77.
80. See Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1219, 1227.
81. See id.
82. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 503; Graham, 822 F.2d at 849-50.
83 See Graham, 822 F.2d at 848-49.
84. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 503. Because the three courts decided against
the Scientologists on their statutory claim, the First, Fourth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits also addressed the Scientologists' constitutional claims. See supra note 74
and accompanying text. The three courts found that the Scientologists' free
exercise claims lacked merit. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 506; Graham, 822 F.2d at
853; Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1225. The courts held that denial of the tax deduc-
tion did not require the abandonment of a central religious practice. Miller,
829 F.2d at 506; Graham, 822 F.2d at 851; Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1222; see also
supra note 63 and accompanying text. The courts, in addition, agreed that
even if their interpretation of § 170 violated the free exercise clause, the gov-
ernment's compelling interests in maintaining a uniform tax system and in en-
couraging charitable contributions sufficiently outweighed any incidental
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II. DEDUCTIBILITY OF FIXED DONATIONS MADE TO
THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY: STAPLES v.
COMMISSIONER
A. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S RELIGIOUS BENEFIT TEST
In Staples v. Commissioner,5 the Eighth Circuit deter-
mined that fixed donations made to the Church of Scientology,
in return for training and auditing services, were deductible as
charitable contributions. 86 The court began its analysis by look-
ing at the nature of the benefit the Scientologists received. The
court emphasized the government's stipulation to the religious
nature of the Scientologists' activities.8 7 Because the govern-
ment stipulated that the Church of Scientology was a tax-
burdens on the Scientologists' religious beliefs. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 506;
Graham, 822 F.2d at 852-53; Hernanadez, 819 F.2d at 1225; supra note 67.
Similarly, the First Circuit thoroughly discussed the Scientologists' claims
of an establishment clause violation. The court rejected the taxpayers' argu-
ment that § 170 on its face created a denominational preference. Hernandez,
819 F.2d at 1218; see also Miller, 829 F.2d at 505; ef. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 56 (1985) (finding that legislative history showed that sole purpose underly-
ing moment of silence statute was to convey message of state endorsement of
prayer in public schools). The Hernandez court noted that the statute pro-
vided a secular criterion for encouraging gifts to all religious and nonreligious
charitable organizations. 819 F.2d at 1219.
The First Circuit also rejected the petitioners' allegations that the Com-
missioner discriminated against churches that conduct individual rather than
congregational services, id., and against churches that require fixed payments
for services rather than relying on voluntary contributions. Id. That court
concluded that the purpose and primary effect of § 170 was to encourage gifts
to charitable organizations and that any incidental impact of this neutral stat-
ute on the beliefs of a Scientologist was negligible. Id.; see also Miller, 829 F.2d
at 505. The Ninth Circuit in Graham noted that any disparate effect upon
Scientologists was not unconstitutional because the government had sufficient
and compelling reasons for its rule. 822 F.2d at 853; see also supra note 67.
Finally, the Miller, Graham, and Hernandez courts considered the
Scientologists' claims of selective prosecution in violation of the first amend-
ment and the equal protection component of the fifth amendment. The courts
held that the taxpayers failed to show that the government acted with discrim-
inatory intent. Miller, 829 F.2d at 505; Graham, 822 F.2d at 853; Hernandez,
819 F.2d at 1227. Apparently, the only evidence of discriminatory intent the
Scientologists offered consisted of internal IRS memoranda indicating that the
Service considered the question of deductibility a close one. See id. at 1226.
85. 821 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987). Procedurally, the Staples case arose in
exactly the same fashion as did the cases in the First, Fourth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits. See supra notes 71-72.
86. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325.
87. Id. Specifically, the government stipulated (1) that Scientology was a
religion and (2) the Scientology organization was a church within the meaning
of § 170(b)(1)(A)(i) and a tax-exempt religious institution under §§ 170(c)(2),
501(a), and 501(c)(3). Id.; see also Miller, 829 F.2d at 501; Graham, 822 F.2d at
846, 848; Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1216. The Staples court noted the stipulations
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exempt organization, 8 it impliedly agreed that the Church was
organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes.8 9
The IRS also conceded that auditing and training were religious
observances rather than educational services.9 0 The Eighth Cir-
cuit determined from these facts that auditing and training ses-
sions, the benefits the Church members received in return for
their fixed donations, were "strictly religious practices." 91
The Staples court next considered section 170 of the tax
code. The court noted that authorities finding a donation non-
deductible generally refer to the donor's receipt of a material,
financial, or economic benefit in return for the donation.92 The
Eighth Circuit determined, however, that courts should con-
strue section 170 in such a way as to be sensitive to religious
practices.93 The court found this construction consistent with
the policies underlying the charitable contribution deduction.9
The Staples panel stressed that religious observances of any
faith were considered under the law of charity to be of spiritual
benefit to the general public.9 5 According to the court, strictly
religious practices were "inherently charitable" in character.9 6
The court thus concluded that no presumption of a quid pro
quo could arise when the return benefit was the right to par-
ticipate in a strictly religious practice.97
The Staples court specifically held that regardless of the
"require that the religious nature of the Scientology activities at issue in these
cases be recognized." 821 F.2d at 2326.
The IRS also conceded that auditing and training were not "instructional
or educational," but were forms of religious observance in which "no subject
matter [was] taught, studied or learned," and that the Church did not actively
solicit contributions from its members or the public, but supported its opera-
tions principally through fixed donations paid by its members. Miller, 829 F.2d
at 501.
88. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325; supra note 87.
89. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982); supra notes 19-20.
90. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325; supra note 87.
91. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327.
92. See id. at 1326. The court distinguished strictly religious or spiritual
benefits from material or economic returns. I&, at 1328.
93. See id. at 1326.
94. See id
95. See id,
96. Id, at 1327.
97. See i&, at 1327. The Eighth Circuit noted that neither the tax court
nor the government cited a case in which a taxpayer had been denied a deduc-
tion for payments keyed to participation in strictly religious practices. Id. at
1326. The court emphasized that society does not place a monetary value on
religious practices. See id. at 1327. Furthermore, the court believed that the
stipulations foreclosed any reliance on the Church's fixed donations as repre-
senting the value of its religious practice. See id. The court found that under
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timing of payments or a church's methods of soliciting contribu-
tions from its members, amounts given to a church with no re-
turn other than participation in "strictly spiritual and doctrinal
religious practices" were contributions within the meaning of
section 170.98 Because the court found that Scientologists re-
ceived the strictly religious practices of auditing and training in
return for fixed donations, the court upheld deductions for
those payments. 99 Thus, the court concluded that the religious
benefit the Scientologists received was not a recognizable bene-
fit-° ° under the tax code. 101
B. ASSESSING THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
In crafting its religious benefit test and upholding the
Scientologists' deductions, the Eighth Circuit created a novel
exception to the traditional directness of the benefit approach
for determining when a donation is a contribution or gift. The
court's analysis is flawed, however, and the ramifications of its
decision are highly problematic. In determining that auditing
and training are strictly religious practices, the Staples court
failed to assess independently whether a fixed donation is a
contribution or gift under section 170. Thus, the court over-
looked one of the two distinct questions that determines the de-
ductibility of a donation. Furthermore, the court's new
religious benefit test likely will face constitutional challenges in
later cases. These faults in the Eighth Circuit's analysis derive
largely from the court's misinterpretation of the policies under-
lying the charitable contribution deduction. In the final analy-
sis, the policies behind section 170 mandate the denial of
the stipulations fixed donations were not market prices set to reap a profit, but
merely the Church's chosen method for raising funds. See id. at 1327-28.
98. Id. at 1327. The court must have used "practices" to emphasize the
religious and doctrinal nature of auditing and training.
99. See icl at 1328. In reaching its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit criticized
the tax court's characterization of the Church's operations as commercial in
nature. See id. at 1325-26. The appellate court pointed out that the tax court's
construction of § 170, see supra note 77, would mean that deductibility of "pay-
ments relative to participation in bona fide religious practices will depend on
the mechanism adopted by the church to solicit support from its members."
Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326.
100. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1328. The court distinguished tuition paid for
parochial school education by noting that the benefits of such an education
were primarily secular. Id. at 1327; see also supra note 61.
101. Because the Staples court ruled for the Scientologists on their statu-
tory claim, the court did not discuss the constitutional issues. See Staples, 821
F.2d at 1328; supra notes 74, 84.
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deductions for Scientologists' fixed donations for auditing and
training sessions.
1. Failings of the Eighth Circuit's Analysis
a. The Eighth Circuit's Initial Determination: Auditing and
Training as Strictly Religious Practices
In making its determination that auditing and training ses-
sions are strictly religious practices,10 2 the Staples court over-
emphasized the significance of the government's stipulations.10 3
The court concluded that the Scientologists received strictly
religious benefits based solely on the IRS's stipulations that au-
diting and training are religious observances and that the
Church of Scientology is organized and operated exclusively for
religious purposes.104
The court's logic must have proceeded something like this.
Because the Church is tax-exempt, it is organized and operated
exclusively for religious purposes.10 5 Because the Church is or-
ganized and operated exclusively for religious purposes, its spir-
itual and doctrinal activities must be "strictly" religious in
nature. Because auditing and training are spiritual or doctrinal
activities of the Church, they must be strictly religious. There-
fore, under the court's legal standard, the religious benefit test,
Scientologists must be able to deduct the fixed donations they
make for such strictly religious services.10 6
Because all tax-exempt religious organizations are organ-
ized and operated exclusively for religious purposes,10 7 how-
ever, the court's reasoning proves too much. Under the Eighth
Circuit's analysis, all of the spiritual and doctrinal benefits tax-
exempt religious bodies grant are strictly religious in nature.
Almost all the benefits of these institutions are of a religious
nature, however. If the strictly religious nature of a return
benefit automatically makes a donation a contribution or gift,
granting a religious organization tax-exempt status would make
almost any donation to that entity tax deductible.
This result is inconsistent with Congress's intent as evi-
denced in the tax code. In contrast to the Eighth Circuit's ap-
proach, Congress explicitly mandated a two-step test to assess
102. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 87.
105. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326; supra note 19.
106. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 22.
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the deductibility of a donation. 08 The first step requires that
an organization be tax-exempt and ensures that the entity oper-
ates for a general charitable purpose.109 The second step de-
mands that a donation be a contribution or gift and ensures
that each specific transaction furthers the recipient organiza-
tion's charitable goals." 0 Even if a charitable organization is
tax-exempt, a donation paid to that entity still must qualify as a
contribution or gift under section 170.111 By resting its finding
that auditing and training are strictly religious practices on the
fact that the Church operates exclusively for religious pur-
poses, the Staples court eliminated the second step of this
approach." 2 The court completely failed to consider indepen-
dently whether a fixed donation is a contribution or gift."
3
The Eighth Circuit's approach leads to the conclusion that
almost all benefits provided by tax-exempt religious organiza-
tions are strictly religious in nature. A closer look at the
court's reasoning, however, suggests that the court intended to
distinguish among the types of religious benefits that religious
organizations can convey. The cout, in fact, misapplied its own
legal standard and failed to examine properly whether auditing
and training are strictly religious practices. In finding that
those sessions are strictly religious practices, the court simply
overstated the IRS's stipulations.
In determining that auditing and training are deductible,
strictly religious benefits, the court relied on the stipulation
that auditing and training are religious observances. 114 Accord-
ing to the court, no quid pro quo arises if the return benefit is
108. See Estate of Wood v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1, 6 (1962).
109. See supra notes 19, 21-22 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
111. See Estate of Wood, 39 T.C. at 6.
112. Although the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits all criticized the
Scientologists' statutory arguments which the Eighth Circuit accepted, see
Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1987); Graham v. Commissioner, 822
F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1987); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1217
(1st Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988), none explicitly recognized
that the Eighth Circuit's characterization of auditing and training as strictly
religious practices ignored the contribution or gift analysis. The First Circuit
came closest to realizing the nature of the Scientologists' claims when it re-
marked that the taxpayers maintained "that all payments to churches for reli-
gious services-whether gifts or not-should be tax deductible under section
170." Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1217.
113. The Eighth Circuit may have acted intuitively to protect a religious
minority. Although this instinct is admirable, courts should address such con-
cerns under a free exercise or establishment clause analysis. See supra notes
62-67, 84 and accompanying text.
114. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326.
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merely the right to participate in such strictly religious prac-
tices. In deriving its exception to the directness of the benefit
test, however, the court tried to distinguish the Staples case
from cases denying deductions to taxpayers who make tuition
payments to tax-exempt sectarian schools. 115 According to the
court, payments to tax-exempt sectarian schools could be de-
ductible but for the element of secular education involved in
the taxpayers' return benefits.116 That secular element makes
the benefits something less than strictly religious. Thus, the
court implied that religious bodies can furnish religious bene-
fits, even spiritual or doctrinal benefits,"17 that are not strictly
religious. Under the religious benefit test therefore, a court
must distinguish between strictly and partially religious bene-
fits. A taxpayer may deduct a donation only if she receives
strictly religious benefits. The Staples court found that audit-
ing and training are strictly religious benefits merely because
the IRS stipulated to their religious character. In focusing only
on this stipulation, the court ignored the Scientologists' admis-
sions that auditing and traiiiing provide secular benefits."18 In
distinguishing the tuition cases, the court recognized that a sec-
ular component may make a return benefit not strictly reli-
gious. The court should have made a similar inquiry in the
Staples case. The court thus failed to consider the distinction
demanded by its own test.
b. The Eighth Circuit's Legal Standard: Implications of the
Religious Benefit Test
Disregarding the Eighth Circuit's inability to apply its own
legal standard, the court's religious benefit test has further sig-
nificant problems. If courts apply the reasoning of the Staples
court broadly, that analysis will cast doubt upon the validity of
earlier cases addressing the deductibility of certain donations to
religious organizations.119 For example, in a case the Staples
115. See id. at 1326; supra note 61.
116. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326-27.
117. See id. The religious education a sectarian school provides often in-
cludes spiritual and doctrinal training. See infra note 119.
118. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1217 n.8 (1st Cir. 1987)
(church claimed that auditing and training help people to overcome bad habits
and physical pain and to improve their communicative and learning capabili-
ties), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988).
119. For example, the religious benefit test might affect decisions refusing
to find that tuition payments to parochial schools were deductible contribu-
tions or gifts. See Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 1972)
(concluding that taxpayers involved received personal benefits in exchange for
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court failed to mention, the tax court held that a rabbi's per-
formance of a Bas Mitzvah in return for a donation to a temple
made the payment nondeductible. 20 Comparing the Bas Mitz-
vah ceremony to the Scientologists' auditing and training ses-
sions shows that both seem strictly religious. 121 In a Bas
Mitzvah ceremony, a young girl, during a sabbath service,
chants prayers, leads the congregation, and may read from the
Torah.122 In auditing and training sessions, a Scientologist
works with an auditor to erase the part of the mind filled with
tuition); Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778, 781 (2nd Cir. 1972) (same);
DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1962) (same). Although
these cases might appear to be quite different from the Scientologist litigation,
the four Scientologist cases all note the tuition cases in some way. See Miller
v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1987); Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d
844, 850 (9th Cir. 1987); Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326; Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1217.
In fact, the First Circuit cites the parochial school tuition cases for the proposi-
tion that the government may recognize the economic cost of religiously ori-
ented services that religious organizations provide to taxpayers. Id. at 1217.
Although the Staples court attempts to distinguish the tuition cases based
on the secular benefit involved in a parochial school education, see 821 F.2d at
1328, such schooling necessarily provides some religious benefit. Many schools
provide direct teaching of religious doctrines, practices, and values. Although
the extent of this benefit might vary substantially among sectarian primary
and secondary schools and colleges, the benefit some institutions provide
might be strictly religious in nature.
Despite the IRS stipulations that auditing and training are religious ob-
servances, see supra note 87, frequently no precise measure of an activity's
religious nature exists. For example, the Church of Scientology itself main-
tains that auditing and training sessions can help individuals improve some
nonreligious aspects of their lives. See Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1217 n.8; supra
note 118. Therefore, even if a primary or secondary parochial education is too
secular to be strictly religious perhaps a seminary education meets the Eighth
Circuit's standard.
120. Feistman v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 590, 592 (1972) (holding
that performance of Bas Mitzvah provided direct and personal benefit to do-
nating taxpayers). The Bas Mitzvah is perhaps the most analogous factual set-
ting to the auditing and training of the Scientologist cases. Despite this, the
Fourth, Ninth, and Eighth Circuits failed even to acknowledge the case. In
Hernandez the First Circuit noted Feistman, but merely as evidence of the
IRS's lack of discriminatory intent, an element of the taxpayers' selective
prosecution claim. See Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1226.
121. The Feistman court noted the social nature of the Bas Mitzvah cere-
mony and compared such an event to a wedding. See Feistman, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 592. The tax court drew an analogy to the parochial school tuition
cases, see id. (citing DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962)), and
concluded that the payment for the Bas Mitzvah was a personal expenditure
regardless of the religious nature of the benefit. See Feistman, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 592.




negative images and gains spiritual competence. 123 There
seems to be little basis for distinguishing the religious nature of
these ceremonies. 2 4 The tax court's denial of a deduction in
the Bas Mitzvah case follows from the directness of the benefit
test, because the donors received a direct benefit in return for
their donation.125 The Eighth Circuit's religious benefit test
likely would demand a contrary result.126
123. See supra note 1.
124. Although the Eighth Circuit noted that it found no case in which a de-
duction was denied for payments keyed to participation in strictly religious
practices, see Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326, the court ignored Feistman. The court's
argument is weakened even further because it did not cite any case in which a
deduction was allowed when the payment was accompanied by reciprocal par-
ticipation in strictly religious practices.
The social nature of a Bas Mitzvah, see supra note 120, arguably distin-
guishes Feistman from the Scientologist cases. A closer analysis, however,
shows that Feistman is in fact directly analogous to Staples. The parties in the
four Scientologists cases stipulated that Scientology is a religion and that au-
diting and training are forms of religious observance. See supra note 87. The
Church itself, however, advertises auditing and training by promoting the non-
religious benefits from those sessions. See supra note 118 and accompanying
text. Therefore, auditing and training have nonreligious facets, just as a Bas
Mitzvah does, even though both Scientology sessions and Bas Mitzvahs are
religious ceremonies (either in fact or by stipulation).
125. Decisions denying deductions for such donations comport with a di-
rectness of the benefit analysis. The directness test protects the policies un-
derlying § 170. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. When a
taxpayer receives a Bas Mitzvah ceremony in return for a donation, the reli-
gious organization must use some of the funds to provide the individualized
service and therefore cannot use all of the donation to benefit the broader con-
gregation. See Feistman, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) at 592 (noting personal nature of
expenditures); supra note 47. Because these benefits fall directly on the tax-
payer, the policies behind § 170 require the denial of a full deduction. As such
a case shows, focusing on the religious or nonreligious nature of the benefit a
taxpayer receives does not maximize benefits to society.
126. The Staples court noted that participation in strictly religious practices
does not constitute a recognizable return benefit. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1328.
A finding that auditing and training are strictly religious practices must take
account of the nonreligious aspects of those services. See supra notes 102-18
and accompanying text. Therefore, if the Eighth Circuit's conclusion regard-
ing the strictly religious nature of those practices is to stand, the term strictly
must be read as synonymous with predominantly (that is, more than 50%).
Because strictly must mean something less than exclusively (that is, at or al-
most 100%), the Feistman facts directly parallel those in Staples. Even though
a Bas Mitzvah serves in part as a social function, it is still a solemn religious
ceremony. The social portion of a Bas Mitzvah certainly does not outweigh the
nonreligious component of auditing and training. Therefore, under the reli-
gious benefit test, the return benefit of a Bas Mitzvah would not destroy a de-
duction.
If the Eighth Circuit interprets strictly religious practices as exclusively
religious, few cases would fall under the court's test. The Scientologist and
Bas Mitzvah cases do not present exclusively religious practices. The only po-
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In addition to placing in question these previously settled
conclusions, the court's approach might affect the ways in
which religious organizations operate.'2 Under the religious
benefit test, donors can deduct donations to religious organiza-
tions even if they receive direct religious benefits.128 This
favorable tax treatment might encourage some religious organi-
zations to charge for religious services.129 If religious organiza-
tions could raise needed funds by providing religious
ceremonies, those entities might spend significant amounts of
time advertising their services. The organizations thus would
have less time to pursue activities that benefit the broader soci-
ety.130 This pay-as-you-go arrangement also might invite the
proliferation of sham religions desiring to make tax-free
money.' 3 ' This would only compound the IRS's current
problems. The IRS already is inundated with applications from
organizations seeking tax-exempt status to cover up profits.132
tential case might involve a taxpayer who pays a church to perform a private
worship service. Cf. Rev. Rul. 78-366, 1978-2 C.B. 241, 242 (allowing deduction
for bequest for masses because masses would be said regardless of donation).
In any event the difficulties with and likely unconstitutionality of drawing
lines based on the religious nature of return benefits, see infra notes 143-55
and accompanying text, argue against the use of any interpretation of the
Staples test and for the application of the traditional means for assessing
whether a donation constitutes a contribution or gift. See supra notes 23-61
and accompanying text.
127. None of the four circuit courts considering the deductibility of
Scientologists' fixed donations contemplated the effect the Eight Circuit's reli-
gious benefit test might have on religious organizations. See infra notes 128-32
and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
129. This view appears cynical, but it may not be an extreme possibility.
Although most religious organizations do not charge for such activities, the
Staples rationale might encourage them to do so. Consider a case in which the
dollars available for charitable giving are decreased significantly. Cf 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (1982) (limiting aggregate amount any taxpayer may deduct
as charitable contributions from federal income taxes in given year). Such a
case could arise if Congress placed a meager limit on the yearly sum an indi-
vidual could deduct for charitable giving. Under such circumstances people
might not give general donations to a religious body. They probably would be
willing, however, to make a "mandatory" donation to receive a wedding, con-
firmation, or Bas Mitzvah service. It is reasonable to believe that people desire
these ceremonies more than generalized participation in church activities.
130. This scheme certainly is inimical to the ideas behind the charitable
contribution deduction. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
131. Because the first amendment prevents courts from inquiring into the
validity of religious beliefs, see supra note 66, the IRS may have its hands tied
if the application of the religious benefit test produces further abuses and
sham religions.
132. See supra notes 19, 22. The IRS weeds out many sham religious orga-
nizations in the process of determining an entity's qualification for tax exemp-
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The Staples rationale also disadvantages secular charitable
organizations.13 3 Essentially, the religious benefit test reads
into the tax code a preference for religious entities.13 Under
the Eighth Circuit's approach, religious organizations may pro-
vide direct benefits to donors, without threatening the deduct-
ibility of donations, as long as those benefits are strictly
religious.135 The Staples rationale, however, does not extend to
nonreligious charitable organizations. Secular charitable enti-
ties still may not provide any direct benefits to contributors.136
This anomaly exists even though neither the language nor the
history of the tax code supports any distinction between reli-
gious and secular charitable organizations. 137
tion. No matter how vigilant the IRS is, however, the Service cannot catch all
illegal operations. If payments to a sham religious organization that managed
to obtain tax-exempt status are tax deductible because return benefits are
"religious" in nature, see supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text, such enti-
ties could offer goods and services to the public at reduced costs and thus com-
pete unfairly with commercial operations. See supra note 29.
133. Cf 26 U.S.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3) (1982) (making no distinction between
secular and religious entities in defining which charitable organizations can re-
ceive deductible donations).
134. If courts adopting the Staples rationale were to choose not to accept a
preference for religious organizations under the tax code, see infra notes 135-
42 and accompanying text, an absurd extension of the Eighth Circuit's test
would arise. If courts applied the Staples analysis to nonreligious charitable
organizations, they would have to construct a broadly applicable term like
strictly charitable benefit. Theoretically, the receipt of such a benefit would
not destroy a deduction.
Although assessing whether a benefit is religious in nature may be diffi-
cult, determining what would constitute a strictly charitable benefit may prove
impossible. Many secular charitable organizations are nonprofit entities that
could be run for profit. Cf. Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 249 (1970) (adop-
tion agencies); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4621, 4830-31 (hospitals); Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2
C.B. 104 (museums); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (orchestras). Hence, the
benefits those organizations can disperse are not charitable by nature. For ex-
ample, a concert association could exist either as a for- profit organization or
as a charitable nonprofit entity. As such, concert admissions are not inher-
ently charitable. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105. Therefore,
although one might be able to understand the meaning of a strictly religious
benefit, no common understanding attaches to a strictly charitable benefit.
The only advan.tage the latter term has over the former is that "strictly chari-
table benefit" implicates no constitutional prohibitions. See infra notes 138-42,
124-55 and accompanying text.
135. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327; supra note 98 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
137. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 107, 501(c)(3) (1982); supra notes 19-20. The First,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits point out that § 170 embodies no distinction be-
tween religious and nonreligious charitable organizations. See Miller v. IRS,
829 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1987); Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 849
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Furthermore, this preferential treatment accorded reli-
gious organizations raises constitutional questions.138 The es-
tablishment clause 39 prohibits the government from endorsing
religious groups to the detriment of secular groups.140 Even
when a court acts to protect the free exercise rights of a reli-
gious minority, it may not infringe upon the strictures of the es-
tablishment clause.' 4 The Staples court's religious benefit test
prefers religious organizations to nonreligious charitable orga-
nizations. This religious preference exhibits the kind of gov-
ernmental endorsement the first amendment forbids.1'
The most serious ramification of the Eighth Circuit's analy-
sis is that it necessarily will force courts to draw unconstitu-
tional distinctions between types of religious benefits. The
Staples court held that a taxpayer's receipt of a direct but
strictly religious benefit in return for a donation to a religious
organization does not destroy the deductibility of the dona-
tion.143 Therefore, the religious benefit test at least requires a
distinction between religious and secular benefits. The court
noted, however, that the IRS should not grant deductions for
tuition payments made to parochial schools.' 44 Because donors
(9th Cir. 1987); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1217 (1st Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988).
138. These constitutional questions are distinct from the Scientologists'
constitutional claims. See supra notes 74, 84. The Scientologists maintained
that an application of the traditional "contribution or gift" test violated their
free exercise and establishment clause rights by failing to protect their reli-
gious liberty.
139. For the text of the first amendment, see supra note 62; see also supra
note 64.
140. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
142. The First and Fourth Circuits concluded that the religious preference
embodied in the Eighth Circuit's and the Scientologists' analyses violates the
establishment clause. See Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 506 (4th Cir. 1987); Her-
nandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1220 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 1467 (1988); supra note 65 and accompanying text; cf. Estate of Thornton
v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (holding that Connecticut statute
providing employees with absolute right not to work on their chosen sabbath
violated establishment clause); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973) (finding that New York law providing tax
benefits to parents of children attending nonpublic schools had primary effect
of advancing religion because, among other reasons, benefits of law would flow
primarily to parents of children attending sectarian schools). Like the statute
in Thornton, the Eighth Circuit's religious benefit test provides an absolute
preference for religion. Beyond the statute in Nyquist, all the benefits of the
religious benefit test flow to those who contribute to religious organizations.
143. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 100.
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receive some religious benefit' 45 in a religious education, even if
the schooling is primarily secular, the court's decision implied a
distinction between strictly religious and partially religious
benefits.146
Drawing such lines is inherently troublesome.147 A court
attempting to distinguish between secular and religious benefits
or between strictly and partially religious benefits will run
squarely into the establishment clause. That provision prohib-
its the excessive entanglement of government with religion.14
Such entanglement results when courts inquire too deeply into
the activities of religious organizations.149 The Eighth Circuit's
approach necessitates just such inquiries.
The religious benefit test does not provide broad general-
izations that courts without further question can apply to
groups of religious organizations. For example, the establish-
145. See supra note 119. Parents who make tuition payments for their chil-
dren's education benefit directly as a part of the family unit and only slightly
less directly through their children.
146. The question then is why grant lesser status for partially religious
benefits received in return for a donation. The Staples court gives no reason,
but one might exist in the court's view of the stipulations in the case. Because
tax-exempt religious organizations operate exclusively for religious purposes,
see supra notes 19-22, perhaps the court felt that the return of a strictly reli-
gious benefit is so closely aligned with the purposes of the organization as to
warrant protection.
The court also posited that denying a deduction to the Scientologists
would make the deductibility of payments relative to participation in religious
practices dependent upon the mechanism adopted by a church to solicit funds.
See supra note 99. The protectionist predilection evident in this statement
could have led the court to protect the return of strictly religious benefits but
to deny protection to benefits having a secular component.
In either event it is difficult to rationalize the court's distinction between
strictly religious and partially religious benefits. To be consistent perhaps the
court could have required a partial deduction in proportion to the religious
portion of the benefit. This approach, however, would create the same practi-
cal and constitutional problems the court's general analysis engenders in situa-
tions beyond the facts of the Staples case. See infra notes 147-55 and
accompanying text.
147. The line between direct and indirect benefits certainly is not clear.
See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text. The tax code frequently re-
quires the IRS to draw fine distinctions. For example, the IRS must distin-
guish between personal and business expenses. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (1982)
(allowing deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses from per-
sonal income). This line certainly is imprecise. Concerns beyond imprecision,
however, arise when drawing the line between strictly religious and partially
religious benefits. See supra notes 124-47, infra notes 148-55 and accompany-
ing text.
148. See supra notes 64, 66.
149. See supra note 66.
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ment clause generally allows governmental aid to sectarian col-
leges, but not to sectarian primary and secondary schools. 150
With this type of generalization, courts can apply the standard
to most factual settings without inquiring into the affairs of the
religious organizations. The religious benefit test, by contrast,
mandates a case-by-case analysis of the religious nature of a
taxpayer's benefit.15' This determination necessarily will re-
quire a court to delve into a church's operations and activities.
The first amendment prohibits this kind of entanglement.152
150. Compare Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766-67 (1976)
(upholding Maryland statute providing grants to any institution of higher edu-
cation in state as long as funds were not used for sectarian purposes) with
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366, 372 (1975) (holding unconstitutional two
Pennsylvania statutes that provided auxiliary services and instructional mater-
ials to sectarian primary and secondary schools). The distinction between
these two cases rests on the broad generalizations that churches generally are
involved with primary and secondary education more closely than with higher
education and that college students usually are less susceptible to religious in-
fluences than younger children. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 764-65. Because such
generalizations are possible, courts need not inquire into religious activities in
the vast majority of such cases. Only the exceptional cases require an analysis
beyond the generalizations. Cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660-61 (1980) (upholding New York statute authorizing
use of public funds to reimburse secular and sectarian primary and secondary
schools for performing various testing and reporting services mandated by
state law).
151. Under the religious benefit test, courts will have to look at each case
to determine how religious a benefit is. Although the line might be clear with
established churches, the strictly, partially, or nonreligious nature of a return
benefit furnished by a unique religion will be difficult for courts to ascertain.
In fact, Staples may have been just such a case absent the important stipula-
tions. See supra note 87. When courts inquire into the activities of religious
outside the mainstream, the potential exists not only for establishment clause
problems but also for discrimination that threatens free exercise rights. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
152. Both the First and Fourth Circuits agree that delving into the activi-
ties of religious organizations to distinguish between the religious and secular
benefits provided by those entities would violate the establishment clause. See
Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 506 (4th Cir. 1987); Hernandez v. Commissioner,
819 F.2d 1212, 1218, 1221 (1st Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988).
The Hernandez court notes the entanglement dangers involved in the govern-
ment's monitoring of church records to determine the religious or secular na-
ture of church services, group programs, and pastoral counseling available to
contributing members. 819 F.2d at 1218. Compare Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 255 (1982) (holding that financial reporting obligations imposed on reli-
gious organizations that received more than 50% of their contributions from
nonmembers created unconstitutional political entanglement) and Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1971) (finding that governmental evaluation of
parochial school records to determine which expenditures were for secular as
opposed to religious education was fraught with dangers of unconstitutional
entanglement) with Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 698 (1970) (finding
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Not only does the establishment clause, through its entan-
glement proscription, forbid governmental inquiry into the ac-
tivities of religious organizations, but both the free exercise and
establishment clauses also prohibit the government from in-
quiring into the religious beliefs of an individual or organiza-
tion.153 Determining the religious or secular nature of a benefit
might not require a detailed examination of religious beliefs.
Drawing the line between the strictly or partially religious na-
ture of a benefit, however, would necessitate the detailed scru-
tiny of religious beliefs.154 To draw this line, a court would
have to assess a religious body's conception of the benefit and
the taxpayers' beliefs regarding the benefit. Both of these in-
quiries offend the first amendment. 155
only minimal entanglement in government's assessment of charitable organi-
zations' property values to administer property tax exemption).
153. See supra note 66. The First Circuit noted that requiring the "govern-
ment to distinguish secular from religious benefits would require it to engage
in ongoing evaluation of the genuineness of assertedly religious services,
thereby entangling itself in church doctrine." Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1221; cf.
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969) (concluding that first amendment prohibits
civil courts from interpreting church doctrine and determining importance of
those doctrines to religion).
154. Distinguishing between the religious or secular nature of admittedly
secular benefits provided by religious organizations (for example, meals)
would require no inquiry into religious beliefs. More difficult cases, however,
would necessitate some inquiry into religious beliefs. The greater the uncer-
tainty as to the religious nature of the benefit, the more searching the inquiry
demanded. Furthermore, the same dilemma would result from any variation
on the Eighth Circuit's test, whether a strictly religious benefit test, a primar-
ily religious benefit inquiry, or some other permutation.
Consider the Scientologist cases absent the stipulations. Because the
Church members maintain that they receive a strictly religious benefit, a re-
viewing court would need to assess the validity of that claim under the reli-
gious benefit test. The religious nature of auditing and training sessions is not
apparent. Therefore, a court would have to delve into the Church's practices
and members' beliefs to discover the nature of the sessions. This kind of in-
quiry necessarily implicates the doctrines of Church members and the sincer-
ity of their beliefs. The first amendment forbids such an inquiry. See supra
note 66.
155. Given the stipulations, the Scientologist cases presented little danger
of entanglement. See Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1218. Because the IRS had stipu-
lated that auditing and training are religious practices, see supra note 87, de-
termining the strictly versus partially religious nature of these services was
unnecessary. The courts did not need to search Church records or inquire into
members' beliefs.
The only potential for entanglement involved the government's determi-
nation of the fees charged by the Church for auditing and training sessions.
Under the Eighth Circuit's test, such an assessment would help to determine
the religious or secular nature of the transaction. See supra note 92 and ac-
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c. The Eighth Circuit's Misinterpretation of the Policies
Underlying Section 170
The Eighth Circuit's faulty approach stems from the
court's misinterpretation of the policies behind section 170. The
court concluded that the policies of section 170 are absolute
with respect to religious organizations.1 56 Noting that the "con-
tribution or gift" provision should be construed in a manner
sensitive to religious practices, the court stressed that the reli-
gious observances of any faith are presumed to be of spiritual
benefit to the general public.157 Given this controlling pre-
sumption, it is not difficult to see how the court could place too
much significance on the government's stipulation to the
Church's tax-exempt status and could carve a new exception to
traditional "contribution or gift" analysis for strictly religious
benefits.
In drafting section 170, however, Congress did not intend to
adopt the absolute presumption the Staples court posited. Con-
companying text. Because the Church made public the nature of fixed dona-
tions and its fee schedule, see supra note 3, the IRS acquired the information it
wanted without peering into the Church's religious practices. The cases thus
paralleled Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1972), in which the Court held
that the assessment of the property values of charitable organizations' land in-
volved negligible entanglement. Id. at 698.
Under the traditional § 170 inquiry into the directness of the return bene-
fit to the donor, nothing more than the superficial entanglement involved in
Walz normally would be necessary. See Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1221 (re-
marking that § 170 requires merely administrative contact rather than doctri-
nal entanglement). In almost all cases, courts can ascertain the directness of a
return benefit from the fact that a taxpayer gives value for it. In addition, be-
cause the established inquiry does not touch on a religious question, i.e., the
religious nature of the benefit, there is little danger of delving into religious
beliefs.
Although there are no line-drawing problems under the establishment
clause in applying the religious benefit test to the Scientologists cases, a less
clear case might exist. For example, suppose a religious organization uses hal-
lucinogenic drugs as part of a ritual or ceremony and charges its members fees
for the allegedly religious "service" which would include the cost of the drugs
and the administration of the ceremony. No doubt, the organization would
conceal information about the drug use.
Members of the church, however, might wish to deduct their payments to
the church as charitable contributions. Because the church would shroud the
nature of the ceremony and the fee arrangement in secrecy to avoid state and
federal drug laws, the government would risk excessive entanglement if it at-
tempted to assess the religious nature of the benefit received. Cf. Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (holding that state determination of whether
religious organization received more than 50% of its donations from nonmem-
bers created unconstitutional entanglement).
156. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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trary to the court's assumptions, not all activities in which reli-
gious organizations engage benefit the general public. A
deduction should be allowed when a religious or secular chari-
table organization uses a donation for its broad public pur-
poses.'5 8 If a charitable organization provides a direct benefit to
a donating individual, including a strictly religious benefit, the
broader public is not served and the individual should not enjoy
a tax deduction.159
2. Protecting the Policies Behind Section 170: Scientologists'
Fixed Donations Under the Directness of the
Benefit Test
Under the directness of the benefit test and the policies it
protects, courts must deny deductions for Scientologists' fixed
donations. The directness of the benefit test does not draw
lines based on the religious or nonreligious nature of the bene-
fit a taxpayer receives in return for a donation. 6 0 Rather, the
directness test focuses on whether a taxpayer receives a direct
and individualized benefit; whether or not religious, or merely
indirect benefits that are shared with the broader commu-
nity.161 If a taxpayer receives a direct return benefit, the court
should determine that her donation is not fully deductible.
In making this determination, courts should not find deter-
minative the mandatory nature of a donation, its set amount, or
the method of payment.162 These inquiries are only tangen-
tially relevant to the determination of whether a return benefit
is direct or indirect. For example, a church might require the
payment of set dues by its members as a precondition to mem-
bership. If the members receive return benefits only as part of
158. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. This principle applies
equally to religious organizations and the benefits they convey. See supra
notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 26-61 and accompanying text.
162. The Staples court looked at these factors but considered them invalid.
See 821 F.2d at 1327. The court was correct in finding that these factors are
not of paramount importance. The First and Ninth Circuits seemed to have
trouble with these elements, however. See Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d
844, 850 (9th Cir. 1987); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1227 (1st
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988). The IRS has held that pew
rents, mandatory church dues, and building fund assessments are deductible.
Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 C.B. 49. The Hernandez court doubted that these rul-
ings would stand under its analysis. 819 F.2d at 1227. These holdings, how-
ever, are proper under the directness of the benefit test because the donating
taxpayers received return benefits only as members of a congregation.
1086 [Vol. 72:1055
CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS
the larger congregation, the payments should be deductible.
Because such donors receive no direct benefits, the church can
use the full amount of the donations to support the organiza-
tion's broader purposes.
Unlike the hypothetical case, members of the Church of
Scientology receive direct religious benefits163 in proportion to
their fixed donations.16 Scientologists may participate in audit-
ing and training only if they pay a prescribed fee for each ses-
sion.165 The benefits of auditing and training thus accrue
directly to the members who pay to participate in those ses-
sions.166 Auditing and training sessions are unlike the general
163. See supra notes 3, 77.
164. None of the three circuits that disagreed with the Staples opinion ex-
plicitly focused on the directness of the benefit test. See supra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text. Of the three courts, the Fourth Circuit came closest to
considering the directness test and the policies it protects. See Miller v. IRS,
829 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1987). The slight deviations of the three circuits and
the tax court from the directness test may seem trifling because all four courts
reached results consistent with the test. A closer look, however, shows the fal-
lacy of that belief. An analysis that focuses on the intentions of the taxpayers,
see supra note 50, or the fixed and mandatory nature of a donation, see supra
note 162 and accompanying text, does not necessarily protect the policies be-
hind the charitable contribution deduction. See supra notes 26-30 and accom-
panying text.
165. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 3, 77. The Eighth Circuit maintained that the
Church's fee system does not change the strictly religious nature of the return
benefit. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327. The court found incongruous the placing
of a market value on a religious practice. Id. The Staples court believed that
the parties' stipulations required the conclusion that fixed donations do not
represent market prices set to reap profits in a commercial venture. Id. at
1328; supra note 87.
Although the Eighth Circuit may be correct in finding that the Church is
not a commercial entity and that fixed donation values do not represent mar-
ket prices, the court read too much into the stipulations at that juncture. Even
if the "fees" charged for auditing and training sessions are not market prices
in the commercial sense, those fees do provide a measure of the value of the
services to Church members. See Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 503-04 (4th Cir.
1987). It is this correlation and the corresponding suggestion of a direct return
benefit that is significant, not the commercial nature of the transaction. To
support its proposition that the Church is not a commercial entity, the court
cites Murdock v. Pennsylvania. That case is inapplicable, however, because it
arose in an entirely different context. 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (holding that
sale of religious literature by Jehovah's Witnesses did not transform their
evangelism into commercial enterprise for purposes of first amendment's com-
mercial speech doctrine).
In addition, the Eighth Circuit was concerned that the test applied by the
tax court and the other circuits would make the deductibility of payments
made for strictly religious practices depend on the method or mechanism
adopted by the church to solicit contributions. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326-27.
Courts, however, focus not on the mechanism for solicitation, but on the di-
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benefits a person receives in return for collection plate contri-
butions to a church. 167 Scientologists do not receive indirect
benefits as a part of a whole congregation.1 68 Rather, auditing
sessions are one-to-one exchanges between a trained Scientolo-
gist and another member of the Church.169 Training sessions
likewise are directed at groups of individuals who pay for the
sessions, not at a broader congregation. 170 Because Scientolo-
gists receive direct benefits, in the form of auditing and training
sessions, in return for their fixed donations, their payments do
not constitute contributions or gifts under section 170 and thus
should not be deductible. 17 '
The basic policies underlying the charitable contribution
deduction support this conclusion. Donations to religious and
rectness of the return benefit a donor receives. A church might require the
payment of a mandatory fee from its members but only provide generalized
congregation-wide benefits. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. In
that case the fee payments would be deductible.
167. See supra notes 1-2, 56-57 and accompanying text.
168. Courts focus on the primary or immediate benefit resulting from the
donation. See supra note 47. Although the whole congregation of the Church
of Scientology eventually might benefit from the auditing and training dona-
tions, the individual members receive the primary and direct benefit in the
form of religious services. When churches perform confirmations and Bas
Mitzvahs in return for donations, see supra note 61, the congregation may ben-
efit in the long run. That conclusion is even more likely given that many of
those ceremonies take place before a gathering of the congregation. See supra
note 122 and accompanying text. Despite that fact courts have found that the
direct benefits flowing to the individual recipients of those services make their
donations nondeductible.
169. See supra note 1.
170. See supra note 2-3. The Church itself, in the enrollment form pro-
vided to new auditees, states that the "benefits obtainable from Church serv-
ices.., are personal and are experienced by the individual himself or herself."
Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1987).
171. The taxpayers in the four Scientologist cases made no alternative
claim that they received only nominal returns, i.e., that the value of their do-
nations exceeded the value of the services they received in return. See Miller
v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1987); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d
1212, 1216 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988); supra notes 49-51
and accompanying text. The Scientologists thus left the courts only two op-
tions from which to choose to label their return benefits: indirect benefits as
received with other members of the congregation, or direct and commensurate
benefits. See supra notes 31-61 and accompanying text.
Even if the Scientologists had maintained that they received only nominal
benefits, their case would have been weak. See supra notes 50-51 and accom-
panying text. The Church members expected to receive religious services of
commensurate value in return for their fixed donations and thus could not ar-
gue that they harbored donative intentions. See, e.g., Graham, 822 F.2d at 850
(Katherine Jean Graham stated before tax court that she "expected to get par-
ticular religious services in exchange" for her fixed donations).
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charitable organizations receive preferred tax status only when
those payments benefit the general public.172 Because the
Church of Scientology uses its members' donations to provide
auditing and training services, the Church cannot use the dona-
tions for its broader, society-oriented purposes. By providing a
direct return benefit, the Church makes the fixed donations of
its members nondeductible. As this analysis makes clear, the
Staples court's assumption that all religious observances pri-
marily benefit the general public is erroneous.173
CONCLUSION
Members of the Church of Scientology claim they may de-
duct from their federal income taxes, as charitable contribu-
tions, fixed donations made to the Church in return for
auditing and training sessions. In upholding such deductions,
the Eighth Circuit created a novel exception to the traditional
test for assessing deductibility under section 170 of the tax code.
The Staples court held that the receipt of a direct but strictly
religious benefit in return for a donation does not destroy de-
ductibility. This religious benefit test calls into question previ-
ous conclusions regarding the deductibility of donations to
religious organizations, creates incentives for religious organiza-
tions to charge for services, disadvantages secular charitable or-
ganizations, and runs afoul of the establishment clause.
Congress established the charitable contribution deduction
because it believed that charitable donations benefit society.
Under an approach consistent with this policy, a taxpayer
makes a deductible donation only if she receives in return
merely indirect benefits that are shared with the community.
If a taxpayer receives a direct benefit, whether religious or non-
religious, in return for a donation, the charitable organization
cannot use all of the funds for the entity's broader public pur-
poses. In such a case, the donation must not be fully deducti-
ble. The religious nature of the return benefit must not affect a
court's analysis. Because members of the Church of
Scientology receive direct benefits in the form of auditing and
training services in return for their fixed donations, those dona-
tions should not be deductible.
David C. Linder
172. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 93-96, 156-59 and accompanying text.
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